note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints
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note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints

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Published by Indiana Center for Global Business, School of Business, Indiana University in Bloomington, IN .
Written in English


Book details:

Edition Notes

Includes tables.

Statementby Jürgen von Hagen.
SeriesDiscussion paper ;, #34, Discussion paper (Indiana University. Indiana Center for Global Business) ;, #34.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsMLCM 93/04538 (H)
The Physical Object
Pagination16 leaves ;
Number of Pages16
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL1989004M
LC Control Number90621590

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von Hagen, Jurgen, "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages , March. This note presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the United States. Nonparametric tests reveal that fiscal restraints significantly affect the probability of fiscal choices and performance, without however preventing extreme by: A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints. By IN (United States). Graduate School of Business) Bloomington J. von (Indiana Univ. Hagen and Bonn Univ. (Germany). Sonderforschungsbereich - Information und die Koordination Wirtschaftlicher Aktivitaeten. Formal fiscal restraints may therefore yield an effective instrument for avoiding excessive deficits and spending, provided they incorporate certain institutional features: the fiscal target must.

A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints. By Jurgen von Hagen. OAI identifier: Provided by: Research Papers in Economics. Suggested articles. To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request. Read the latest articles of Journal of Public Economics at , Elsevier’s leading platform of peer-reviewed scholarly literature. (). A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints. (). A visible hand? Bond markets, political parties, balanced budget laws, and state government debt. (). Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations. (). Balanced budgets and business cycles: Evidence from the . This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized.

A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints. By Juergen von Hagen. Abstract. SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg , D Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages , March. Full references (including . A Note on the Empirical Effectiveness of Formal Fiscal Restraints is that a monetary union requires formal fiscal restraints limiting individual member states' budgetary powers to reduce the. The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa and the difficulties that central governments have had in dealing with fiscal irresponsibility on the part of regional governments in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and India has made the study of transfer systems one of the most important areas of research in federalism today. A model of a.